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A Step Into the Regulatory Vacuum: Cable Television
in the District of Columbia

Philip R. Hochberg*

Before cable television (CATV) can become a reality in the District of
Columbia, one important jurisdictional question must be settled: Who has the
authority to regulate CATV in the District? At present, there is a conflict of
opinion as to whether the District government, or Congress alone, is empowered
to franchise a cable system. The District's chief legal officer has said that the
city does not have the power to assert jurisdiction over CATV;I however, some
members of the City Council feel that the District has the present authority
to do SO. 2 Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution lies at the root of this
jurisdictional dilemma. It gives Congress the power "To exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District
the Seat of the Government of the United States . . .

. .

. as may

. . . become

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has pervasive jurisdiction over cable television.' The FCC,
on the other hand, has allowed wide latitude to the local jurisdictions. As we
have seen, Congress has total jurisdiction over the affairs of the District of
Columbia. 5 This paper considers whether the actions of the FCC or Congress,
or both, prevent the District from exercising jurisdiction over cable television
and concludes that, in fact, both the FCC and Congress have left an avenue
open for the city. To comprehend the implicit nature of this permission, it is
B.S., Syracuse University; LL.B., The George Washington University Law School. Member,
District of Columbia Bar. This article was prepared in major part on a consulting basis with the
Mayor's Economic Development Committee, Washington, D.C.
1. Memorandum from C. Francis Murphy, Acting Corp. Counsel, to Julian R. Dugas,
Director, Dep't of Economic Development, November 2, 1970.
*

2.

CITY COUNCIL'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MANPOWER COMMITTEE REPORT 1 (1971).

3. Congress may, of course, delegate to the District authority to make local police regulations.
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 106-10 (1953); see also Maryland
and District of Columbia Rine and Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Washington, 442 F.2d 123, 126 n.14
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
4. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). But see Midwest Video
Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971).
5. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 21:63

necessary first to consider the manner in which both bodies have dealt with
cable television, then to compare their actions with the general regulatory
authority that Congress has delegated to the District of Columbia.
Regulation by the FederalCommunications Commission
CATV began in the late 1940's in Pennsylvania and Oregon communities where
television reception was poor because of the terrain. Enterprising businessmen
erected antennas and ran cables to their subscribers' homes. Initially, the
CATV operators simply wanted to sell television sets, but they soon realized
that a business potential existed both in improving reception and originating
telecasts expressly for the cable system. CATV grew slowly in its early years,
serving only as a supplement to existing television stations. Its expansion was
nearly negligible during the FCC's "freeze" on the growth of television stations
from September 1948 to July 1952. s When the "freeze" ended there was
speculation that many new stations would go on the air, thus eliminating the
need for cable systems. 7 However, new local stations did not fill the gaps:
[T]he economics of the television industry were such that many
communities did not get local stations, and this situation was
compounded by the difficulty soon encountered by UHF stations
because of their unequal competitive position in intermixed or
overshadowed markets. After a temporary pause, the rate of growth
of CATV systems again picked up .... I
In 1954, FCC cable regulation was first sought. WJPB-TV, a small market
station in Fairmont, West Virginia, complained that in 1953 a cable system
had gone on the air and wired up 30 percent of the market, while refusing to
carry WJPB-TV. The station asked the FCC to define its jurisdiction over the
cable system and to apply the same rules to it that were applied to television
stations.9 The Commission took no action on this request. Previously, speeches
and testimony by its members had expressed doubt as to the FCC's power to
regulate CATV.' °
Thereafter, on April 6, 1956, a small group of radio and television operators
6. See Report and Order F.C.C. 48-2182, providing that "no new or pending applications
for the construction of new television broadcast stations would be acted upon by the
Commission. Sixth Report and Order, I RR 91:601, para. 2 (1952).
7. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON THE TELEVISION
COMMUNITIES

INQUIRY-THE

PROBLEM OF TELEVISION

SERVICE

FOR SMALLER

6 (Comm. Print 1959).

8. Id.
9. Smith, The Emergence of CA TV: A Look at the Evolution of a Revolution
OF THE IEEE, 972 (1970).
10. See supra note 7 at 17.
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asked the FCC to either declare that the nation's 288 CATV systems were
common carriers, or institute a formal hearing to consider the inclusion of cable
operators under common carrier regulation. The FCC decided that Congress
did not intend the common carrier regulations to be applied to persons who
were not common carriers in the "ordinary" sense of the term.
Fundamental to the concept of a communications common carrier
is that such a carrier holds itself out or makes a public offering to
provide facilities by wire or radio whereby all members of the public
who choose to employ such facilities and to compensate the carrier
therefor may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own
design and choosing between points on the system of that carrier
and other carriers connecting with it. In other words, the carrier
provides the means or ways of communication for the transmission
of such intelligence as the subscriber may choose to have transmitted. The choice of the specific intelligence to be transmitted is,
therefore, the sole 1responsibility and prerogative of the subscriber
and not the carrier. '
Since CATV subscribers did not have a choice of the signals to be transmitted
over the cable (that choice was determined by the system itself) the FCC
concluded that CATV systems were not "ordinary" carriers.'
Six weeks later, on May 22, 1958, the FCC released a Notice of Inquiry
stating its intention to look toward resolution of the CATV question on an
overall, rather than piecemeal, basis." The FCC determined a year later not
to attempt to regulate cable systems as common carriers; moreover, it refused
to exercise jurisdiction on Title 1i grounds, i.e., on any of the following bases:
that of the FCC's plenary power, that the CATV operator was a broadcaster,
that he had a rebroadcasting right, or that CATV had an adverse effect on
broadcasting." For the first time, the FCC asked Congress to provide it with
some guidance on the regulation of cable television:
[lit appears to us that there is no question as to the power of
Congress to regulate CATV's or give the Commission jurisdiction
to do so, if it desires. But, as an administrative agency created by
Congress, we are of course limited by the terms of the organic
statute under which we were created, and must look to that statute
to find the extent of our jurisdiction and authority. 5
It. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. J.E. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 254 (1958).
12. Id.
13. See Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems in Docket No. 12443, 26
F.C.C. 403,404 (1959), referring to Notice of Inquiry, F.C.C. 58-493.
14. Id. at 427-31.
15. Id. at 427. The Commission also included specific requests for legislation relating to
rebroadcasting consent and local station carriage as they related to CATV. See id. at 430, 438,
and 44 1.
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In 1962, when Congress still had not acted,"6 the FCC began to assume
jurisdiction over CATV, even without a specific mandate. In Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp., 7 the FCC denied a permit to install a common carrier
microwave radio relay system because it felt the economic impact of a
microwave-fed CATV system would jeopardize a local television station in
Thermopolis, Wyoming. The FCC stated that it would allow the application
to be refiled when the cable operator (rather than the microwave common
carrier) agreed to certain protections for the local station: (I) to carry the local
station and (2) not to duplicate, (i.e., to "nonduplicate") the local station's
programs for a 30-day period prior or subsequent to airing by the local
station. s The FCC had managed to regulate CATV, not by regulating the
unlicensed cable operator, but by back-door regulation of the already licensed
common carrier feeding the cable system. In December, 1962, the FCC issued
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket No. 13895'1 in which it suggested
that Business Radio Service2° licenses be conditioned on (I) the cable operator's
carriage of the local station and (2) his nonduplication of the local station's
programming. After its assertion of jurisdiction over common carrier
microwave-fed CATV systems was affirmed by the court of appeals, 2' the FCC
extended the scope of the rulemaking proceeding to include all microwave-fed
CATV systems (in Docket No. 1523 3 ). 2
The two dockets culminated in the First Report and Order, made effective
3
on June I, 196 5.2
All microwave-fed cable systems, whether fed by common
carrier or by privately owned Business Radio, were ordered to carry all local
television stations and to nonduplicate for 15 days before and after the
broadcast. Although it had taken a truly significant step, the FCC still sought
guidance from Congress: "We must ... take into consideration the fact that
if Congress legislates in this field any rules we now adopt may have to be
adjusted. 2 Concurrently with the issuance of the First Report and Order, the
FCC began taking the final step in assuming total jurisdiction over cable
television. The FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry and Notice oJ Proposed
16. The subject of congressional involvement in cable regulation will be treated in the text
accompanying notes 48-57 infra.
17. 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962).
18. Id.at 465.
19. 27 Fed. Reg. 12586 (1962).
20. These stations were owned by and licensed to the particular cable operator and served only
him; common carriers served anyone and were much broader in terms of service.
21. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 951 (1963).
22. 28 Fed. Reg. 13789 (1963).
23. 30 Fed. Reg. 6038, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
24. Id. at 6039, 38 F.C.C. at 685 (1965).
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Rulemaking in Docket No. 15971,11 beginning an investigation into the
regulation of all CATV, especially major market cable. As in the First Report
and Order, the FCC adhered to the position that "clarifying legislation would
be desirable, and [we] have no intention of by-passing congressional action in
this field." 2' Furthermore:
[T]he Commission would welcome (i) a Congressional guidance as
to policy and (ii) Congressional clarification of our authority, which
would lay the troublesome jurisdictional question at rest . . . . The
rule-making proceeding instituted by this notice will . . . be
conducted concurrently with legislative consideration, with final
Commission decision withheld for an appropriate period to afford
27
Congress an opportunity to act.
In the far-reaching Second Report and Order,2 the FCC proceeded to
promulgate new rules regarding carriage, nonduplication, notice of commencement of CATV service and a host of other procedural guidelines." Nevertheless, the FCC continued to look to Congress:
The threshold jurisdictional question is twofold (a) whether the
Commission has jurisdiction as a matter of law over non-microwave
CATV systems under the present provisions of the Communications
Act, and (b) whether it would be appropriate to exercise any such
jurisdiction without any legislative enactment on the subject. 0
In fact, the FCC appeared to take special pains to avoid criticism for
usurping jurisdiction in an area previously denied to it by the Congress:
In this report, we stress again the desirability in our view of
congressional guidance in this important area. But thus far, the
congressional guidance or clarification has not been forthcoming;
and in the present circumstances, our decision cannot properly turn
on a desire to avoid litigation or on the hope of obtaining policy
guidance in the CATV field. 3
The FCC specifically outlined those areas which particularly warranted
congressional attention. Generally, it said: "We therefore state again that we
would welcome congressional guidance as to policy and congressional
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Rules.
30.
31.

30 Fed. Reg. 6078, I F.C.C. 2d 453 (1965).
Id. at 6083, 1 F.C.C. 2d at 465.
Id. at 6083, I F.C.C. 2d at 466.
31 Fed. Reg. 4540, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725 (1966).
See Sections 74.1103(a), 74.1103(e), 74.1105, 74.1107 and 74.1109 of the Commission's
31 Fed. Reg. at 4540, 2 F.C.C.2d at 726-27 (1966).
Id. at 4543, 2 F.C.C.2d at 734.
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clarification of our authority in all respects in this field.""2 One of the areas
in which the FCC specifically asked for guidance was that of dealing with local
franchising problems: "Congress will be asked to consider the appropriate
relationship of Federal to State-local jurisdiction in the CATV field, with
particular reference to initial franchising, rate regulation, and extension of
service."33
Despite the FCC's repeated requests, Congress still had not acted in 1968
when the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction over the regulation of
CATV, in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. 3 41 The basic question
presented to the Court was whether the FCC had the authority to regulate
CATV. Speaking for the majority, Justice Harlan reviewed the history
of the FCC's junket into CATV regulation, then went on to note that the
Communications Act of 1934 applies to "all interstate and foreign communication by wire and radio," and that the FCC is entrusted with the responsibility
to ". . . make available . . . to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide radio communication service."' ' He
proceeded to deal with respondent's contention that by Congress' refusal to
explicitly grant jurisdiction to the FCC, it intended that the agency should refrain from regulating cable systems. The Court found the congressional inaction
argument unpersuasive: "We cannot derive from the Commission's requests for
legislation anything of significant bearing on the construction question now
36
before us.''
The Court took specific cognizance of congressional inability or unwillingness to act in the matter of cable television:
The Commission's requests for legislation evidently reflected in each
instance both its uncertainty as to the proper width of its authority
and its understandable preference for more detailed policy guidance
37
than the Communications Act now provides.
In December 1968, the FCC issued another Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 18397,11 in which it attempted to adopt
a "retransmission consent concept" requiring cable systems to obtain permission from the originating station before they imported a distant signal. Several
9
areas of inquiry were outlined in yet another Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 4564, 2 F.C.C.2d at 787.
Id. at 4564, 2 F.C.C.2d at 788.
392 U.S. 157 (1968).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 170.
33 Fed. Reg. 19028, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
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this one in July, 1970, in Docket No. 18397A-in which the FCC again noted
that it was seeking congressional guidance.40 And still another Notice of
Proposed Rulenaking4'-this dealing with the federal and local relationship
in Docket No. 18892-was also issued in which the FCC noted that despite its
requests for legislation, 42 "to date, no legislative resolutions of these issues
43
have been reached."
The FCC's assertion of jurisdiction over CATV has been somewhat
jeopardized by Midwest Video, Inc. v. United States.4 There, the Eighth Circuit
struck down the FCC's mandatory origination rules which required all CATV
operations with over 3,500 subscribers to originate programming to a
"significant extent." The court relied on Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc.41 for the proposition that a CATV operator is not a broadcaster. Consequently, the Communications Act did not authorize the FCC to
compel program origination. The court specifically declined to comment on
"the power of the FCC to permit CATV's to originate programs and to prescribe reasonable rules for such CATV operators who voluntarily choose to
originate programs.""41 However, it did say that: "[tihe Commission's power
to adopt rules requiring cablecasting to the extent that it exists must be based
on the Commission's right to adopt rules that are reasonably ancillary to its
responsibilities in the broadcasting field." 47
Midwest would appear to have the most validity if the FCC had chosen to
totally pre-empt the local franchising area-a situation which does not exist.
This too might constitute FCC expansion into a "non-ancillary" area of
broadcasting. Nevertheless, such an assertion does not exist and, to that extent,
Midwest is not applicable to the instant problem. Nevertheless, it must still
be noted that in Midwest Video, the court contrasted Congress' preemption
of the licensing of radio and television operators with its history of inactivity
in the CATV field. 4" Thus, the lack of congressional guidance has once again
returned to haunt the FCC. As Chairman Burch said in testimony given shortly
after the Midwest decision was handed down:
[1In the 60's the FCC lost the Southwestern case in the 9th Circuit,
and it was argued that we lacked all authority to regulate off-the39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

35 Fed. Reg. 11045, 24 F.C.C.2d 580 (1970).
Id.at 11047, 24 F.C.C.2d at 585.
Id. at 11044,25 F.C.C.2d 50 (1970).
See note 32 supra.
35 Fed. Reg. at 11044, 25 F.C.C.2d 50 (1970).
441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971).
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
441 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id.
Id.
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air cable. At that time, while asserting that we believed that we did
have authority to take the actions in question, we also said that
clarifying legislation would be desirable. All that is just as true
today. We would welcome such legislation. It would settle the
49
authority problem once and for all.
And he further stated:
[Wihile we believe we have sufficient authority to take the actions
in question, I want to repeat what we have said on a number of
prior occasions-that clarifying legislation would be most welcome.
It would settle the authority problem once and for all. 5°
CongressionalLegislation
At the time the FCC first decided to refrain from taking jurisdiction over
CATV, 51 Congress began investigating the cable question. The Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings in the summer of 1958. One product of the hearings was
the "Cox Report" 52 which concluded that the FCC had been too conservative
in refusing to regulate CATV:
It may be that the courts would hold that the Commission does
not have the power to regulate CATV operations-or that the
possibility of such an ultimate ruling renders congressional
clarification advisable. However, up to this point the Commission
has shown no inclination to seek authority in the field through
amendment of the Communications Act. As is suggested below, it
is difficult to see how the Commission can discharge its overall
responsibilities without authority over this important aspect of
53
television service.
Measures to provide for the regulation of cable were introduced in the 86th
Congress5 and hearings were again held in July 1959. The Senate Communications Subcommittee followed these by introducing a measure on its own
which provided for cable licensing, as well as other protection for television
stations.5 5 The cable industry, at first, was divided on the measure but ulti49. Statement of F.C.C. Chairman Dean Burch, before the Communications Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, June 15, 1971.
50. Statement of FC.C. Chairman Dean Burch, before the Communications Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, July 22, 1971.
5 1. See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.
52. See note 7 supra.
53.

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS.,

REPORT ON THE TELEVISION

INQUIRY-THE

PROBLEM OF TELEVISION

SERVICE

COMMUNITIES 6 (Comm. Print 1959).

54.
55.

S.1739, S.1741, S.1801, S. 1886 and S.2303, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
S.2653, 86th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1959).
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mately opposed it." By throwing its full weight against the bill, the industry
was able, by a one-vote margin, to have it recommitted to Committee.
As has been discussed, the FCC petitioned Congress for jurisdictional
legislation on a number of occasions in 1965. However, the legislation was not
forthcoming. In 1966, the FCC specifically sought congressional authorization
to permit it to regulate CATV.57 The bill was favorably reported by the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, but failed to reach the floor
for debate. 51 In December 1968, in July 1970, and again in June and July
1971, the FCC asked for congressional guidance. Still Congress has not
acted." In light of the history of the Commission's action and specific
congressional inaction, it is a valid conclusion that Congress has left regulation
totally to the FCC; the FCC has in turn, left some very specific areas to the
local jurisdictions. ° To await specific congressional action in the area may be
to wait fruitlessly.
State and Local Regulations
State Regulation
The various attempts to impose state-wide jurisdiction have been haphazard
at best. Although the United States Supreme Court refused to overturn Nevada's assumption of jurisdiction over CATV6 ' few states have jumped into
the breach. Only seven states regulate cable television in any significant manner:
Nevada,' 62 Wyoming, 3 Connecticut,"4 Rhode Island, 5 Vermont," Hawaii67 and
Illinois.6 8 Massachusetts is expected to assume regulation shortly. 9
The cable industry-which once fought tooth and nail to avoid jurisdiction
by the FCC-now feels that it possesses and should assert complete jurisdic8
tion to prevent any state usurpation in the cable jurisdiction vacuum. The
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
1954).
64.

65.
66.

See Smith, supra note 9, at 974.
See H.R. 13286, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
H.R. REP. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
See text accompanying notes 38-43 infra.
See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556 (1970), affg, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 711.090(1967).
See In re Cokeville Radio & Elec. Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 129, 133-35 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 16-331 (1966).
R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 39-19-3 (Supp. 1969).
VT. STAT. ANN.

tit. 30, § 503 (Supp. 1970).

67.
68.

21,206.
Opinion, Atty Gen. of Hawaii, 1969 Util. L. Rep.
III. Commerce Comm., Docket No. 56191 (September 9, 1971).

69.

VARIETY,

70.

Supra note 41, at n. 3.

Nov. 7, 1971, at 68.
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spectre of rate regulation seems to have sent the cable operators to the FCC. 7'
Local Regulation
If state regulation can be referred to as haphazard, then local regulation may
be termed totally bewildering. Although most local jurisdictions will attempt
to derive some monetary gain from the authorization of cable franchises, some
do not require a franchise at all. In one notable case, despite a city's adoption
of a very strict franchising ordinance with a comprehensive scope, a state court
ruled that use of the telephone company lines places a cable system beyond
the purview of the city's franchising authority." The FCC has long been aware
of the position of the cities in the cable picture. For instance, in the Notice
of the Proposed Rulemaking in Docket No. 18892, 73 it stated that a combined
local-federal approach was best for the orderly growth of cable. Earlier it had
said that the local entity should focus on certain specific matters, such as:
the legal, technical, financial and character qualifications of the
franchise applicants; the area to be served; the showing as to plans
or arrangements for pole line attachments with the public utility
or arrangements with a common carrier or other appropriate
feasibility plans; the reasonableness of the rates to be charged; the
quality of service and repair in specific areas, etc.74
Even more recently, in the "Letter of Intent" sent by Chairman Dean Burch
to members of those congressional committees concerned with CATV, the
Chairman stated the FCC's intention to "leave a number of areas to local
regulation. .. ."
(a) Local franchising authority will set "reasonable deadlines" for
construction and operation of systems. Moreover, the Commission
will require that the franchise impose a duty on the cable system
to have an operable head-end within one year after a certificate of
compliance from the Commission. The Commission also stated it
believes a fifteen (15) year franchise with a reasonable renewal
period would be satisfactory.
(b) The local franchising authority should maintain programs for
review of subscriber rates and technical standards.
71. For an excellent treatment of this area of the regulatory aspects, see Botein, CATV
Regulation: A Jumble of Jurisdictions,45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 816 (1970).
72. City of New York v. Comtel, 57 Misc. 2d 585, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem.,
30 App. Div. 2d 1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1968), affd mem., 304 N.Y.S.2d 853, 25 N.Y.2d 922,
252 N.E.2d 285 (1969). But cf Better TV, Inc. v. New York Telephone Co., F.C.C. 2d __,
23 R.R.2d I (1971).
73. See note 41 supra.
74. Supra note 38 at 19032, 15 F.C.C.2d at 425.
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(c) The Commission recommends a three percent limit on
franchise fees exacted by the city; in such cases as the three percent
limit is exceeded, "the franchising authority shall submit a showing
of the appropriateness of the fee specified, particularly in light of
the planned local regulatory program.7"
At present, the regulatory power of the local jurisdictions is somewhat
confused. In Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Fremont,16 the Sixth Circuit
invalidated ordinances which regulated and imposed a gross receipts tax on
CATV. The court found the ordinances invalid because they imposed a gross
receipts tax in violation of article I, section 8, of the Constitution and because
they did not contain definite standards for regulation and administration. As
to the issue of federal preemption, the court stopped short. It said: "In view
of our disposition of the issue of the invalidity of the ordinances, we do not
find it necessary to determine on this appeal to what extent regulation of CATV
has been preempted by the Federal Government or to what extent reasonable
regulations may be imposed by municipal ordinance.""
Authority of the District of Columbia
The authority of the District of Columbia to issue a cable franchise is principally grounded in two sections of the District of Columbia Code: Section 1-226
concerning the police power 7" and Section 1-244(d)79 concerning the issuance
of revocable permits in the construction of tunnels and laying of conduits.

Police Power
80
Section 1-226 of the District of Columbia Code authorizes the Commissioners
to make whatever reasonable and normal regulations are necessary "for the
. . . comfort . . . of all persons . . . within the District of Columbia."

Under the police powers, the District may not do that which Congress has
specifically refused to allow."1 However, the long history of congressional
inaction regarding the jurisdiction of the FCC may not be interpreted as a
75. 31 F.C.C.2d 115, 136, 139 (1971).
76. 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
77. Id. at 550.
78. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-226 (1967).
79. Id. at § 1-244(d).
80. For a treatment of the applicability of the Reorganization Act, see text accompanying
notes 99-101 infra.
81. See Fireman's Ins. Co. of Washington, D.C. v. Washington, Civil No. 1027-71 (D.D.C.
Oct. 20, 197 1). See also note 3 supra.
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refusal to allow the District to act. Rather, the total lack of congressional
guidance is proof positive that Congress has virtually abandoned the CATV
jurisdictional problem. Despite constant pleas from the FCC, Congress has not
acted on any of the jurisdictional questions involving CATV. Specifically, it
has not acted on the question of the federal-local relationship. The FCC
proposes to allow local jurisdictions virtually unfettered freedom in granting
franchises." The record is absolutely silent as to the wishes of Congress
regarding CATV in the District of Columbia. It may therefore be validly
assumed that this congressional "nonaction" is tantamount to congressional
action permitting the FCC and the various local jurisdictions to move forward
on their own. Congress' failure to carve out an exception for the District of
Columbia should not give rise to any reluctance regarding the assertion of
jurisdiction on the part of the city.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals touched on the very heart of
this argument in Filipo v. Real Estate Commission of the District of Columbia."3 The Board of Commissioners had found that racial discrimination in
housing had a potentially dangerous effect on the citizens of the District of
Columbia due to overcrowded ghetto housing conditions, the result of racial
discrimination. To alleviate the poor housing conditions, the Commissioners
enacted Fair Housing Regulations pursuant to Section 1-226 of the Code. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the regulations, although there
was no specific congressional authorization to enact them. 84 It found that the
power of the Commissioners was increased to be comparable to that of any
municipal corporation and said:
[T]here is no doubt that congressional legislation on a particular
subject can preclude regulation of that subject by the Commissioners
. . . but absent such unique limitations or congressional
,occupation of the field,' the Commissioners exercising their local
legislative power may promulgate reasonable and usual police
s5
regulations.
The thrust of a regulation issued pursuant to Section 1-226 of the D.C. Code
need not insure only the lives, limbs or health of the residents. Ultimately, it
enhances their comfort, quiet and good order. Certainly, if "Fair Housing"
regulations which have a great "impact upon the rights of property ownership"
and the "freedom of . . . citizens to contract" 6 and which "contemplate a
82. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
83. 223 A.2d 268 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966).
84. Id. at 271, 274-77 (dissenting opinion).
85. Id. at 272.
86. Id. at 275.
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compromise between competing constitutional and statutory protections," 7 are
to be upheld, then regulations involving CATV where an agency of the federal
government has delegated specific functions to the municipalities should also
be upheld.
The courts have upheld other exercises of the police power beside Filipo.
In Taylor v. District of Columbia,8" the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the assignment of various vending spaces in downtown
Washington. This suggests an analogy with the thrust of a major portion of
the cable regulations: the assignment of business areas. While Taylor obviously
involved a small merchant with a small business operating in a very small part
of the city, the assignment of business areas for CATV is an extension of the
Taylor theory with the operating area enlarged. Similarly, CATV franchises
would qualify as "assigned" areas.
Ewing v. Chase 9 also upheld an exercise of the police power. There, regulations requiring alterations in the design of a theatre to aid the safety of theatre
patrons were found to be a valid exercise of the police power. In Johnson v.
District of Columbia, a law was upheld prohibiting cruelty to animals in the
"interest of peace and order." 90
In the CATV case, the regulations may appear to be far afield from the
normal context of police power regulations. However, the uses of regulations
based on the police power to enforce commercial marketing practices, theatre
design, prohibitions on animal cruelty, or fair housing laws also seem to be
on the periphery of the police power. Since the laying of cables, the construction
of conduits, the stringing of overhead wire and the overall construction of a
CATV system may very well pose a threat to the lives, limbs, health, comfort
and quiet of persons in the District of Columbia, regulations authorizing
construction of CATV are an absolute necessity." Furthermore, CATV
concerns the comfort of citizens of the District of Columbia insofar as their
comfort may be partially measured by the cable service they receive. Cable
will add to their enjoyment by offering distant television signals or local
origination channels. It can aid public awareness through local access channels.
87. Id.
88. 24 App. D.C. 392 (D.C. Ct. App. 1904).
89. 37 App. D.C. 53 (D.C. Ct. App. 1911). See also 20 Stat. 131 (1878); United States ex
rel. Strasburger v. Comm'n, 16 D.C. (5 Mackey) 389 (1887).
90. 30 App. D.C. 520, 522 (1908). Cf., Maryland and District of Columbia Rifle and Pistol
Ass'n, Inc. v. Washington, 442 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where gun regulations issued pursuant
to D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-227 (1967), were upheld.
91. Crane v. District of Columbia, 289 F.557 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See also Heylman v. District
of Columbia, 27 App. D.C. 563 (D.C. Ct. App. 1906).
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It can provide services to the city through police and fire channels, traffic
monitoring, and a myriad of other cable services. And it might be the forerunner of two-way communications.
The recent case of Firemen's Insurance Co. of Washington, D.C. v.
Washington9" acutely supports the above thesis. In striking down regulations
prohibiting geographic discrimination and arbitrary cancellation of policies
within the District, the court noted that there was specific congressional
legislation in the District of Columbia insurance field. The very specific
occupation of the insurance field by Congress compared to the very specific
nonaction in CATV provides the fundamental distinction.9 3
Revocable Permits
Section 1-244(d) authorizes the Commissioners "to grant revocable permits
upon such terms, conditions, bonds and rentals as the Commissioners may
propose for the construction of tunnels and the laying of conduits and pipes
in the alleys, streets and avenues in the District of Columbia under the
jurisdiction of the Commissioners." 94 The wide scope of the authority granted
under this section is evidenced by the virtual lack of any case law interpreting
it. The only restriction placed on the Commissioners' authority under Section
1-244(d) is that regulations based on it must tend to promote the public health,
safety and general welfare.95 Thus, it also would seem to authorize the levy of
a franchise fee. There is no reason to allow the Commission to condition the
granting of a permit upon payment of a bond or rental while not permitting
it to do the same upon payment of a franchise fee.
It has been argued by the District's chief legal officer96 that the District of
Columbia Public Space Rental Act operates to limit the issuance of a permit
under Section 1-244(d). This argument manifests an unduly broad reading of
the law. By the terms of the Space Rental Act, the Congress intended that:
[P]ublic space in the District which the Commissioner finds is not
required for the use of the general public may be made available
by him for use, for business purposes, by or with the consent of
92.
93.

Supra note 77.
On the authority of the District to regulate CATV, see generally E.

CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

JAFFE,

JUDICIAL

at 43-44. Professor Jaffe contends that where Congress is

unable to determine a policy on issues which demand congressional expression, the failure to act
should be viewed as an abdication of its legislative authority.
94. Supra note 76.
95.
Electrical Contractors Ass'n of the District of Columbia v. McLaughlin, 153 F. Supp.
653 (D.D.C. 1957).
96.
Memorandum from C. Francis Murphy, Acting Corp. Counsel, to Julian R. Dugas,
Director, Dep't of Economic Development, November 2, 1970.

1971]

Cable Television

the owners of private property abutting such space, upon payment
to the District of compensation for the use of such space, and on
the condition that such use will be discontinued in whole or in part
whenever the Commissioner determines that all or part of the public
space is requiredfor the use of the general public. 7
The entire thrust of the Space Rental Act is directed toward allowing the
operators of private businesses abutting public space to use that public space
for private gain,98 whereas Section 1-244(d) is designed to provide for the
issuance of permits to private businesses which serve the public interest. Thus,
if the space is required for the use of the general public, the terms of the Space
Rental Act would be inapplicable and Section 1-244(d) of the D.C. Code would
apply. There can be no doubt that a cable system would be for "the use of
the general public" and beyond the purview of the Space Rental Act.
Furthermore, other sections of the Space Rental Act do nothing more in
supporting the view of the District's chief legal officer. Both Sections 7-90511
and 7-908'" of the D.C. Code (part of the Space Rental Act) deal with the
rental of public space. Section 7-905 is concerned with the rental of public space
on or above the surface; Section 7-908 is concerned with the rental of subsurface
space. Section 7-905 provides "that nothing herein contained shall be construed
as requiring the Council to require the payment of rent as a condition to the
use of public space ....
."This section merely does not require payments of
rent by a public utility for installation of equipment or facilities. On the other
hand, it does not prohibit a requirement that public utilities pay nor does it
prohibit the granting of a permit to some other person.
Section 7-908 certainly does not prohibit the District from issuing a permit
to a CATV system. That section allows a permit to be given to a private
business on, among other conditions: (1) that the business agrees that the public
interest is not waived, and (2) that even underground construction by the
business may be subject to the introduction of any pipe or other "public...
underground construction" so long as it is "in the public interest to place [the
pipe] in or through" the private construction. Therefore, if the grant of a permit
under Section 7-908 cannot pre-empt the paramount public interest, then the
availability of CATV cannot be precluded by this section. Thus, it would
certainly be permissible to introduce cable into an already constructed vault.
Although Section 7-908 does not specifically deal with the issuance of a
permit to construct cable, it would be pointless to prohibit construction of a
97. 82 Stat. 1156 (Emphasis added).
98. Section 302 further emphasizes the overriding public interest factor.
99. 82 Stat. 1157.
100. 82 Stat. 1158.
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cable system designed to serve the public interest merely to wait upon prior
construction by someone else so that cable might be introduced into it. This
interpretation, when taken in conjunction with the specific grant of authority
in Section 1-244(d), obviously allows the issuance of a permit. Moreover, the
authority is in the Commissioner to determine what is in the public interest.',
Power to License Business
Additional authority for the franchising of cable can be found in Section 47230 1, et seq. of the D.C. Code. Section 47-2301 states that no one may engage
in a business for which a license is required without first having obtained that
license. Section 47-2344 also grants a power "to require a license of...
businesses or callings not listed in this chapter and which . . . require
inspections, supervision, or regulation." In addition, Section 47-2345(a) grants
the Commissioner the power to make "any regulation that may be necessary
in furtherance of the purpose of this chapter. . . ." When taken in conjunction
with Sections 1-226 and 1-244(d) of the Code, the above sections support the
District of Columbia's assumption of jurisdiction over CATV. Although
Congress has not given specific authority to the District to franchise cable
systems, the general authority granted by Congress is sufficient to authorize
the Commissioners to determine that CATV should be included in those businesses to be licensed.'10 Although the power of general legislation is reserved
to Congress, the applicability of that legislation to certain businesses may be
established pursuant to regulations issued by the District of Columbia. 03

101. In its definitional section, Congress specifically excluded from the terms of the Public
Space Rental Act the following:
"Vaults" shall not include public utility structures, pipelines, or tunnels constructed
under the authority of Section (d) of the Act approved December 20, 1944, as amended
(D.C. Code, Section 1-233(d) ...
It is obvious that in excluding "vaults" of public utilities from invasion by abutting private
businessmen, Congress simply did not want abutting owners to have even the remotest chance of
interfering with needed public utilities. The exclusion from the Public Space Rental Act would
not run to construction "for the use of the general public."
102. See Savage v. District of Columbia, 54 A.2d 562 (D.C. Mun. App. 1947), aff'd, Kochne
v. Matthews, 169 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949).
103. Any fees for licenses must be commensurate with the cost of inspection, supervision or
regulation. Nevertheless, there is a presumption that a fee is reasonable and in proportion to the
cost of supervision. Abdow v. District of Columbia, 108 A.2d 374 (D.C. Mun. 1954). Furthermore,
this does not limit the amount to be collected under the franchise fee. See text accompanying note
98.
It would be impossible for the District to characterize CATV as a public utility, then to assert
jurisdiction over it without enabling legislation. Public utilities are statutorily defined pursuant
to Section 43-103 of the Code. Thus, any attempt to bring a cable system under the jurisdiction
of the Public Utility Commission must be supported by specific authority from Congress. However,
attempted unfranchised use of telephone company facilities presumably would be subject to
regulation by the District under Section 1-726 of the D.C. Code, 27 Stat. 21 (1892).
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Power in Mayor-Commissioner or City Council
Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 196710 transfers those functions formerly
performed by the Commissioners to the Mayor-Commissioner or the City
Council. Section 401 transfers all functions to the Mayor-Commissioner except
as otherwise provided. Section 402 transfers certain specified functions to the
City Council. Furthermore, Section 406 grants a veto power to the Commissioner. Included in Section 402 are "Making regulations under D.C. Code,
Sections 1-226 and 1-227."'Il However, the reorganization plan appears to
specifically omit the powers under Section 1-244(d) from vesting in the City
Council.'1 In light of the above, the power to make regulations and to grant
franchises appears to be divided between the Mayor-Commissioner and the City
Council.
The adoption of a regulation authorizing the Mayor to grant a franchise
seems to be the proper procedure. Nevertheless, since the franchise must include
an aspect of regulation which resides in the City Council pursuant to Section
1-226, any selection of a franchisee by the Mayor should be subject to the
ultimate advice and consent of the City Council and thus dependent on whatever
criteria it might set down.
Conclusion
The position that CATV must be classified by the Congress as a public utility
or that the Space Rental Act must be amended to enable the District of
Columbia Government to grant authority for a cable system is untenable. While
specific legislation would be needed to have a cable system operate as a public
utility, the Space Rental Act in no way prohibits the granting of a permit for
the installation of a cable system.
Since the FCC has assumed total authority in the cable field (Congress
having abdicated its authority) and the Commission has expressed a "handsoff" policy for local franchising, the District would be well within its authority
to grant franchises. Specific support is provided by Sections 1-226, 1-244(d),
47-2344, and 47-2345(a) of the Code. Finally it has been shown that the
divergence of responsibility in the Reorganization Act makes the better policy
one of cooperation between the Mayor-Commissioner and the City Council.
104.
105.
106.
Code in

32 Fed. Reg. 11669, effective Nov. 3, 1967.
Section 402(4), 32 Fed. Reg. 11672 (1967).
The Reorganization Plan specifically vests power under the following Sections of the D.C.
the City Council: Section 1-244(a), Section 1-244(b), Section 1-244(f) and Section 1-244(h).

